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INTRODUCTION 
On January 20, 2011, the University of Connecticut’s 
(“UConn”) athletic department received a scathing letter from 
major donor Robert Burton.1  Burton, a highly successful 
printing industry executive, has donated over $7 million to 
support both academic and athletic programs at the 
University.2  A former college football player and NFL draft 
pick, Burton shares a love of football with his three sons, one 
of whom served as team captain for the Huskies in 1999.3  
 
 1.  The portions of Burton’s January 19, 2011 letter to former UConn athletic 
director Jeff Hathaway that are of particular relevance to this Note read:  
“[A]s the largest donor in the UConn football program. . .I told you that I 
wanted to be involved in the hiring process for the new coach. I also gave you 
my insight about who would be  a good fit for the head coaching position as 
well as who would not. . .For someone who has given over $7,000,000 to the 
football program/university, I do not feel as though these requests were asking 
for too much. . .To be crystal clear, I was not looking for veto power over the 
next hire; I just wanted to be kept in the loop and add value and comments on 
any prospective candidates. . .You and your committee of three talked to some 
coaches and made a critical decision about who you were going to hire without 
input from knowledgeable people who care about the program. . .You do not 
have the skills to manage and cultivate new donors or the ability to work with 
coaches. . .I did not graduate from UConn, but my son Mike and his wife are 
UConn grads, and UConn did give me an honorary PhD. . .I earned my voice 
on this subject as your number one football donor/supporter, by naming the 
Burton Family Football Complex and by giving millions of dollars in 
scholarship money to UConn’s football players and its Business School. . .I 
supported [the former coach’s] football camp as a sponsor and gave thousands 
of dollars for additional requests for things like artwork at the football 
complex and an audio system for the player’s weight room. . .I am fully 
qualified to assess coaches and their ability to match up with the university’s 
needs, and I have done so for football programs from Vanderbilt to New 
Haven, as well as several schools in the Ohio Valley Conference and [the] Big 
Ten. . .After this slap in the face and embarrassment to my family, we are so 
upset that we are out of UConn. . .What that means is that we do not want to 
deal with people like you and your committee, who we do not trust and cannot 
count on to make the correct decisions or do anything right with our 
money. . .We want our money and respect back. . .Over the past years, the 
Burton family has donated over $31 million to support special education and 
scholarship programs in America. . .It is a shame that UConn will not be on 
our list going forward.” 
Letter from Robert Burton, Univ. of Conn. Donor to Jeffrey Hathaway, Former Univ. of 
Conn. Athletic Dir. (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.ctpost.com/sports/ 
item/Burton-s-letter-to-UConn-3855.php [hereinafter Burton letter]. 
 2.  Neil Vigdor and Rob Varnon, UConn booster Burton: Hit man with a heart – 
and a football addiction, CONN. POST, Feb. 1, 2011, available at 
http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/UConn-booster-Burton-Hit-man-with-a-heart-and-
989760.php - page-1.  
 3.  Id. As a student, Burton was the recipient of a full scholarship from his alma 
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While he has contributed to UConn academics by establishing 
two endowed scholarship funds, it was Burton’s $2.5 million 
gift towards the construction of a new $50 million on-campus 
football complex in 2002 that helped launch the program into 
Division IA, and earned Burton recognition as UConn’s most 
valuable booster.4  Yet just nine years later, in 2011, on the 
heels of the most successful season in UConn football’s 
history, Robert Burton asked for his money back.5 
A booster like Robert Burton is every college athletic 
program’s dream.  In 2006, only 19 of the 119 total 
universities in the Football Bowl Subdivision netted an actual 
profit from their respective programs.6  On average, only 
sixteen universities broke even between 2004 and 2006.7  
With the vast majority ending their seasons in the red, 
philanthropy has become vital to the success and prestige of 
college athletic programs.8  Booster dollars translate to state-
of-the-art facilities, top-of-the-line equipment, and cream-of-
the-crop recruits.  This recipe for athletic success often spills 
over onto the university’s plate as well, as schools reap 
notable benefits from national exposure.9  In this age of high-
profile Division I football and basketball, where professional-
level stakes continue to erode the amateurism of decades 
past, athletic departments feel pressure when it comes to 
cultivating and nurturing relationships with major donors.10 
 
mater, Murray State University in Kentucky. He was captain of the Murray State 
football team, a four-year first team starter, and an All-American selection in his senior 
year. After graduating, he was a 19th-round selection of the San Francisco 49ers and 
later signed with the Buffalo Bills. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id.   
 6.  See MATTHEW DENHART ET AL., CTR. FOR COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY AND 
PRODUCTIVITY, THE ACADEMICS ATHLETICS TRADE-OFF 29 (2009), available at 
http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/athletics.pdf. 
 7.  Id 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  For example, after Northwestern University’s appearance in the 1996 Rose 
Bowl, the University boasted a 30% increase in applications for the upcoming academic 
year. Id. at 6.  
 10.  The Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, established 
with the purpose of identifying ways to prevent athletic programs from interfering with 
the academic integrity of American institutions, referred to the growing competition 
between colleges for the acquisition of resources as an “arms race.” See Knight Found. 
Comm’n on Intercollegiate Athletics, A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports and 
Higher Education 25 (2001), http://knightcommission.org/images/pdfs/ 
2001_knight_report.pdf; James P. Strode, Donor Motives to Giving to Intercollegiate 
Athletics 1-2 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the Ohio State University), 
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And as the Burton letter demonstrates, hell hath no fury 
like a booster scorned.  When UConn’s athletic department 
sought to replace departing head football coach Randy Edsall 
in early 2011, Burton ignited a feud with UConn athletic 
director Jeff Hathaway that garnered national media 
coverage after he was not consulted in the decision.  As copies 
of the very expressive letter were leaked to the press, Burton 
was pegged as. . .well, a prima donor.  But are multi-million-
dollar boosters like Robert Burton justified in their 
expectation of influence over a collegiate athletic program? 
Part I of this Note will discuss the vital role boosters play 
in college athletics, and will explain why colleges, 
universities, and other non-profit organizations have 
increasingly relied upon the generosity of donors in recent 
years.  Additionally, this section will explore the various 
motives that drive philanthropic giving, specifically focusing 
on how power, control, and influence may motivate major 
donors in college sports. 
Part II will redirect towards a discussion of the traditional 
legal relationships and conflicts arising between donors and 
institutions, and will stress the importance of clear donative 
intent in gift agreements.  This section will also deconstruct 
the common law barrier to donor standing – an obstacle that 
historically prevented the merits of many donor-initiated 
claims from being heard and resolved. 
Part III will introduce the emerging phenomenon of 
venture philanthropy, a departure from more traditional 
methods of charitable giving that affords donors the ability to 
manage and oversee their funds.  It will include an analysis of 
Smithers v. St. Luke’s/Roosevelt Hospital, a landmark case 
for donor standing, specifically focusing on what constitutes a 
“special interest” in a charitable organization.11 
Finally, this Note will compare and contrast collegiate 
boosters like Robert Burton with venture philanthropists and 
other donors who reserve managerial rights for themselves 
when conferring gifts to institutions.  It will conclude by 
finding that, despite the growing need for financial assistance 
from donors in collegiate athletics, accepting certain 
 
available at http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Strode%20James%20Patrick.pdf? 
osu1148304953 [hereinafter “Strode”]. 
 11.  See Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2001). 
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restricted gifts – those with considerably tight strings 
attached – may only serve to further erode the integrity and 
amateurism of the NCAA. 
I: MODERN DONORS: THE TREND TOWARDS CONTROL 
Due to our nation’s current economic climate, American 
universities, charitable foundations, and other non-profit 
entities have experienced a significant decline in funding from 
state and local governments.12  In response to the downturn, 
these institutions have been forced to seek alternative 
financial resources.13  College athletic departments are 
especially susceptible to the sting of inadequate funding, as 
the expenses of the majority of college sports programs 
substantially outweigh revenues.14  Approximately 75% of 
NCAA Division I programs lose money annually, while the 
expenses necessary to maintain competitiveness continue to 
increase each year.15  To close the funding gap, athletic 
departments have increasingly relied upon philanthropic 
giving.16  For instance, in 1965, donations from boosters 
accounted for 5% of athletic revenues.  But today, donors 
contribute nearly 20%.17 
Soliciting contributions from donors has become vital to 
the success and sustainability of not only college athletic 
programs, but charities and non-profits as well.  As such, 
these institutions continually strive to understand the 
psychology of philanthropic giving.  Philanthropy as we 
understand it today is a relatively new concept.  In the United 
States, the practice emerged and developed in the 20th 
century with the establishment of private foundations by 
industrial giants like Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller.18  Yet 
these champions of industry did not give with both hands – 
rather, wealthy donors traditionally utilized private 
foundations as a means of retaining control over their 
 
 12.  Strode, supra note 10, at 1.  
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id.  
 18.  See generally INDERJEET PARMAR, FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY: 
THE FORD, CARNEGIE, & ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATIONS IN THE RISE OF AMERICAN 
POWER (2012) (discussing how the philanthropic foundations established by the “Big 3” 
influenced American society and politics in the twentieth century). 
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charitable gifts.19  In lieu of donating assets directly to an 
institution or organization, establishing a private foundation 
afforded donors the ability to oversee the management and 
distribution of their funds.20  Though the practice and advent 
of philanthropy in our society is far more widespread than it 
was during Rockefeller’s time, donors of the 21st century are 
becoming increasingly demanding with respect to control and 
management of their gifts.21  In the view of one commentator, 
“society has moved and is continuing to move toward a 
results-oriented, quasi-commercial, social engineer’s 
conception of charity.”22 
To gain perspective on why this attitudinal shift in 
philanthropy has occurred, and perhaps begin to understand 
UConn football booster Robert Burton’s outrage, it is helpful 
to examine the theories behind why people give in the first 
place.  In recent decades, numerous studies have been 
conducted to measure donor motivation.23  Specifically, “[t]he 
instruments developed by sport researchers have focused on a 
range of motives for giving, from psychosocial constructs such 
as feelings of loyalty to tangible benefits such as preferential 
seating for football games.”24  A 2006 study, conducted at a 
large football-oriented Midwestern university, developed a 
model that narrowed the range of athletic booster motives to 
just four: achievement, affiliation, philanthropy, and power.25  
According to the study’s results, achievement ranked the 
highest among the four, leading the researchers to conclude 
that “donors give money in an effort to fulfill vicarious 
 
 19.  See Alan F. Rothschild, Jr., How Donors May – and May Not – Exercise Control 
of Charitable Gifts, 16 TXNEXEMPT 110 (2004). 
 20.  Id. at 10. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  This social shift reflects the quasi-professional shift that has occurred in 
collegiate athletics. Programs are becoming increasingly “results-oriented,” and many 
commentators argue that big-time Division I football and men’s basketball programs 
are teetering on the verge of commercialization. Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar 
Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2437, 2439 (2005). 
 23.  See, e.g., JOSEPH C. SMITH JR. ET AL., ATHLETIC FUND-RAISING: EXPLORING 
THE MOTIVES BEHIND DONATIONS 2-3 (1989); E.J. Staurowsky, B. Parkhouse, and M. 
Sachs, Developing An Instrument to Measure Athletic Donor Behavior and Motivation, 
10 J. SPORT MANAGEMENT 262, 262-277 (1996); J.M. Gladden et al., Toward a Better 
Understanding of College Athletic Donors: What Are the Primary Motives? 14(1) SPORT 
MARKETING QUARTERLY 18, 18-30 (2005). 
 24.  Strode, supra note 10, at 33.  
 25.  Id. at ii.  
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triumphs concurrent with successful athletic squads.”26  
Affiliation, which links charitable giving with a donor’s sense 
of belonging, placed second.27  The philanthropy motive, which 
sought to measure the number of donors giving without 
expecting something in return, ranked third.28  Power ranked 
last among the four motives, suggesting that at this 
particular university, the donors surveyed did not have an 
especially strong expectation of a quid pro quo relationship 
with the institution.29 
The finding that power ranks lowest among donor motives 
in college athletics is something of an anomaly.  Despite its 
low ranking, researchers and analysts studying donor 
motivation do not discount power as a viable “hidden” motive.  
Because the majority of research conducted on donor 
motivation relies upon the honesty of respondents, it is 
reasonable that the stigma attached to the “desire for power” 
deters participants from speaking truthfully.30  “[I]t may be 
viewed as faux pas to divulge [that] the reason for engaging in 
philanthropic behavior is to gain power.  People may wish to 
think that their gift is an altruistic gesture, rather than a 
selfish act for personal gain.”31  Other studies on 
philanthropic motivation support the theory that great 
contribution and great expectation go hand-in-hand.  
Research conducted by the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana 
University concluded that, while motives for giving are 
consistent along the economic spectrum from poor to wealthy, 
when major donors contribute major dollars toward a purpose 
of their choice, they “invariably want to shape rather than 
merely support” that cause.32 
Ample evidence from the world of college sports, including 
the Burton letter, supports the hypothesis that some donors 
give to athletic programs with an unspoken expectation of 
access and influence.  When that agenda is exposed, however, 
 
 26.  Id. at 82.  
 27.  Id. at 83.  
 28.  Id. at 83-84. 
 29.  Id. at 84. 
 30.  Strode, supra note 10 at 85. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Paul G. Schervish, Major Donors, Major Motives: The People and Purposes 
Behind Major Gifts, in 16 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 85, 86 (Dwight 
F. Burlingame, Timothy L. Seiler, Eugene R. Tempel eds., 1997), available at 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/research_sites/cwp/pdf/majordonors.pdf. 
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donors and institutions alike may feel repercussions – be they 
mere disapproving jeers from the sports community, or full-
scale sanctions from the NCAA.  In 2005, Logan Young, an 
athletics booster at the University of Alabama was convicted 
of bribery in federal court for using his financial influence to 
seek out top high school recruits for the University.33  Most 
recently, and most notoriously, former University of Miami 
football booster Nevin Shapiro allegedly doled out thousands 
of proscribed benefits to at least seventy-three Miami football 
players from 2002 through 2010.34  It is wholly plausible that 
the stigma created by these public scandals involving illicit 
boosters would deter an average donor from admitting even 
their slightest expectation of access and influence.  
Nevertheless, as evidenced by research and real-world 
prototypes, the power motive is not to be discounted. 
Yet not all power-thirsty donors cause headaches for their 
respective institutions and the NCAA.  In fact, quid pro quo 
donations in college sports are not unheard of.  Many athletics 
booster clubs have developed some sort of progressive scale of 
dollar amounts, guaranteeing perks like special seating, 
tickets, or even an invitation to the team banquet at the end 
of the season in exchange for a specified donation amount.35  
But what dollar amount actually buys a donor influence over 
the program? 
II: DONOR VS. INSTITUTION: LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS AND 
DISPUTES 
Typically, the process of making a major gift to a college, 
university, or other non-profit organization does not merely 
consist of writing, signing and handing over a multi-million 
dollar check.  Accounting for the institution’s needs and the 
 
 33.  Strode, supra note 10, at 84.  
 34.  The numerous benefits Shapiro provided to players at the University of Miami 
included “cash, jewelry, prostitutes, parties in his mansions and on his yacht, elaborate 
meals and nights out at expensive nightclubs and strip bars, bonuses for athletes’ play 
on the field, special bonuses for injuring players on another team, and, in one instance, 
an abortion for a stripper a player had impregnated.”  U. of Miami’s ‘Booster 
Bombshell’: ‘The Craziest Scandal in NCAA History’, THE WEEK (Aug. 19, 2011, 1:13 
PM), http://theweek.com/article/index/218426/u-of-miamis-booster-bombshell-the-
craziest-scandal-in-ncaa-history. 
 35.  See, e.g., Longhorn Foundation: 2011 Benefits Chart, TEXASSPORTS.COM, 
http://www.texassports.com/ sports/lfoundation/spec-rel/benefits-chart.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2012).  
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donor’s preference, gifts may be either designated for a 
specific purpose or unrestricted.36  Often, when a donor 
decides to make a major financial contribution, he intends the 
gift to be used for a specific purpose.37  A donor is free to 
dictate his own specific purpose for a gift, such as the 
construction of a new building, support for a particular 
program, or whatever else he chooses.38  However, the 
institution is not required to accept a restricted gift that it 
does not intend to honor.39  “[I]n practice most major gifts are 
negotiated agreements between the donor and the nonprofit’s 
executive or board leadership.”40 Institutions recognize the 
importance of discussing gift restrictions with major donors 
prior to accepting their contributions, and the necessity of 
preserving the terms in a written gift instrument to avoid 
future misunderstandings.41 
Under the Restatement of Property, donor intent is the 
paramount consideration when interpreting a gift 
instrument.42  The provisions a donor chooses to include in a 
gift agreement are particularly valuable to the determination 
of a gift’s identity, as remedies available to both donor and 
donee are contingent upon a court’s interpretation of the 
donative document.  If a donor chooses to give an unrestricted 
gift to an institution, it is presumed that the donor gives with 
both hands and relinquishes all interest and control upon the 
gift’s completion.43  In contrast, a trust is created when a 
donor manifests his will to create a fiduciary relationship 
between himself and a trustee, and the donor subjects the 
trustee to a duty to use the trust for a stated purpose.44  
Finally, if a donor chooses to attach express conditions to his 
gift, the donee’s interest may be subject to forfeiture or 
reversion in the event that the donee fails to meet the 
requirements or conditions set forth by the donor in the deed 
 
 36.  Unrestricted gifts are those given without any strings attached and available 
to use as the institution sees fit.  See JULIA I. WALKER, NONPROFIT ESSENTIALS: MAJOR 
GIFTS 3 (2006).  
 37.  Id. at 2. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 4. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id.  
 42.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 10.1 (2003). 
 43.  THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 324.  
 44.  Id. 
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of gift.45 
When it is uncertain whether the provisions in a gift 
agreement create a trust or a restricted gift, courts generally 
favor an interpretation of the former over the latter.46  As one 
court explained, “[b]ecause forfeiture is a harsh remedy, any 
ambiguity is resolved against it.”47  In the event that a 
condition is breached however, forfeiture is the required legal 
remedy.48  Where the language of a document is ambiguous as 
to donor intent, courts opt to construe the instrument in a 
manner that will more effectively confer a benefit to the 
public.49  However, if a donor clearly manifests his intent to 
create a restricted gift, that intention will be honored.50 
In L.B. Research and Education Foundation v. UCLA 
Foundation, a California court grappled with the question of 
whether a deed of gift constituted a charitable trust or a 
restricted gift.51  In that case, a donor had contributed $1 
million to UCLA for the establishment of an endowed chair at 
UCLA’s medical school.52  The plaintiff Foundation claimed 
that the conditions attached to the gift had been ignored, and 
filed suit against the University demanding that the funds be 
transferred to the University of California, San Francisco, 
School of Medicine.53  Upon UCLA’s motion for dismissal, the 
court was forced to delineate the differences between a 
charitable trust and a conditional gift.54 
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the court 
defined “charitable trust” as the intentional creation of a 
 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  L.B. Research & Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 714 
(2005).  
 48.  GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 324 
(2012) (“Courts of equity are hostile to conditions and the harsh forfeitures which they 
involve.”). 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  L.B. Research, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 714. While the law requires that courts 
utilize a donor’s intention as their compass in determining the meaning of a deed of gift, 
there is dissention among courts and commentators over the extent to which outside 
documents and testimony, i.e., extrinsic evidence, may be used to ascertain the donor’s 
intention. The majority fosters the “plain meaning rule,” which prohibits extrinsic 
evidence from being introduced to contradict the plain meaning of the instrument’s 
words.  
 51.  L.B. Research, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 710. 
 52.  Id. at 712.  
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Id.  
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fiduciary relationship between donor and trustee.55 
Additionally, the court identified three elements necessary for 
its creation: intent, trust res, and charitable purpose.56  It 
went on to distinguish a charitable trust from a restricted 
gift.57 “The gift will be construed as one of a fee simple subject 
to a condition subsequent if it is expressly provided in the 
instrument that the transferee shall forfeit it or that the 
transferor or his heir or a third party person may enter for 
breach of the condition.”58 
In ascertaining the intent of the parties, the court was 
required to rely upon the “writing as a whole,” and concluded 
that the instrument indeed conferred a restricted gift.59  The 
court found that the writing demonstrated an intent that the 
fund revert to a contingent donee in the event that UCLA did 
not use it for its designated purpose.60  The court concluded 
that L.B. Research intended to impose an enforceable 
obligation on UCLA to use the money in accordance with the 
stated conditions.61  The University contested, however, that 
because the gift agreement did not contain an express 
forfeiture provision, it could not be construed as a restricted 
gift.62  The court responded by noting that, although UCLA’s 
failure to abide by the conditions outlined in the gift 
agreement would not necessarily constitute a forfeiture for 
the “entire University of California system,”63 it would 
nevertheless constitute a forfeiture for UCLA’s medical 
school, the institution specifically designated by the 
Foundation as the donee.64  As L.B. Research shows, the 
manner in which a court construes the language of a gift 
instrument and interprets donative intent may significantly 
impact not only the remedies available to a plaintiff donor, 
but more importantly, whether the merits of the donor’s claim 
 
 55.  Id. at 713; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 11 (1959). 
 56.  L.B. Research, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713-15.  
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 714; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 11 (1959).  
 59.  Id. at 715-16.  
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 715 (citing City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 859 (1999)).  
 62.  L. B. Research, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 715. 
 63.  Id. at 715-16.  
 64.  Id. at 716 (“Because UCLA’s loss will be UC San Francisco’s gain, the nature of 
this forfeiture supports rather than defeats L.B. Research’s position and does not 
require adoption of a view antagonistic to the donor’s charitable intent.”).   
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will survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.65 
Though this concept seems to contradict the deference 
given to donor intent discussed in the previous section, a 
donor lacks standing at common law to enforce the terms of a 
completed gift, unless he or she expressly reserves the right to 
do so.66  This provision may appear in an instrument as a 
right of reverter or as a right to redirect.67  Therefore, 
hypothetically, to effectively bring a private lawsuit and 
reclaim his funds, Robert Burton’s deed of gift to UConn 
would have had to contain both a provision reserving him the 
right to be consulted during the coach selection process, and a 
reversion. If a gift instrument does not contain such language, 
an aggrieved donor’s only hope for recourse rests with the 
attorney general, who, at common law, has the authority to 
enforce the provisions of a donative instrument.68 
The power delegated to the attorney general to enforce 
charitable gifts stems from the English common law notion of 
the Crown as parens patriae.69  Historically, the Crown bore 
the exclusive responsibility to “facili[tate] the alleviation of 
suffering among its most vulnerable subjects,” and, as an 
agent for the Crown, the attorney general was burdened with 
the duty of enforcing charitable gifts.70  This state interest in 
the enforcement of charitable funds resonates today, as the 
common law remains an important source of authority for 
state attorneys general to enforce donor intent.71  “Where 
property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed 
by the terms of the gift to devote the property to a particular 
one of its purposes, it is under a duty, enforceable at the suit 
of the Attorney General, to devote the property to that 
purpose.”72 
In recent decades, however, the attorney general’s role in 
the enforcement of charitable gifts has been criticized as 
antiquated and inadequate.73  The offices of attorneys general 
 
 65.  Id. at 716-17. 
 66.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959).  
 67.  Id. 
 68.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959). 
 69.  Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society Vs. 
Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1136 (2005) [hereinafter Goodwin].  
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959). 
 72.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959). 
 73.  Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1138.  
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are notoriously understaffed and underfunded, and the duties 
of this public official extend far beyond mere oversight of 
charitable gifts.74  But while the expansion of individual 
standing to bring enforcement suits would potentially 
alleviate this problem, courts have been reluctant to grant 
standing to private parties for fear of unnecessary lawsuits 
that would likely drain charitable assets.75  Because public 
benefit is the essence of a public charity, it is rational to 
conclude that these organizations “must be protected from 
harassment and loss.”76  Thus, courts have been wary to open 
their doors to private parties who lack a tangible stake in the 
charitable property.77 
Some state courts, however, have opted to relax standing 
requirements as they pertain to beneficiaries of a charitable 
trust or gift on a subjective basis by implementing the special 
interest doctrine.78  A court may invoke the special interest 
doctrine to determine whether a plaintiff’s affiliation with a 
charity entitles him to standing.79  Factors that the court 
weighs include: the act(s) spurring the cause of action, the 
remedy sought by the plaintiff, fraud or misconduct by the 
charity or its directors, the nature of the benefitted class and 
its relationship to the charity, and the attorney general’s 
availability or effectiveness.80 
Had the court in L.B. Research and Education Foundation 
v. UCLA Foundation interpreted the donative instrument as a 
trust rather than a restricted gift, the Foundation’s 
opportunity for judicial remedy would have been diminished – 
at least in some capacity.  The Foundation would have been 
required to conjure additional arguments and justifications to 
establish its standing without the aid of the attorney general.  
The court presented those potential arguments sua sponte, 
and determined that even if the language of the donative 
document were read to construct a charitable trust, the 
Foundation would nonetheless be entitled to individual 
standing to sue because it satisfied the qualifications of an 
 
 74.  Id. at 1139.  
 75.  Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 756 (N.Y. 1985).  
 76.  Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1140.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id. at 1141. 
 79.  Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c (1959). 
 80.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c (1959). 
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interested party.81  Conceptually, a lawsuit brought by a party 
that demonstrates the requisite special interest in an 
institution’s objectives is less likely to be frivolous.82  For this 
reason, courts have become increasingly comfortable granting 
standing to beneficiaries and other interested parties who 
seek “to uphold the best interests of the charity.”83  Despite 
this kink in the general rule, when it comes to donor-initiated 
suits, courts have, for the most part, elected to continue to 
apply the common law decree that the attorney general is the 
designated enforcer of charitable gifts.84  Moreover, state 
legislatures typically have refused to afford statutory relief to 
individual donors vexed by the standing problem.85 
Prior to the creation of a concise set of uniform laws, an 
ambivalent mix of trust law, corporate law and contract law 
governed disputes arising between donors and institutions.86 
The inconsistent application of these doctrines proved to be 
“disadvantageous for both the donors and the charitable 
institutions receiving their gifts.”87  For instance, governing 
boards and trustees typically enjoyed greater freedom under a 
corporate standard, but were confined to very strict 
parameters under trust law.88  As a result of these judicial 
 
 81.  L.B. Research, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 717-18. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1142, 1148 (“In the past, the courts automatically 
accorded [founders and endowers] a power of ‘visitation’ to supervise their gifts once 
given, treating the reservation of visitorial power as inherent in the endowing of a 
corporate charity. The early cases based the doctrine on the power everyone has to 
dispose, direct, and regulate his own property. Today, we do not recognize that property 
given by a donor to charity remains in any sense ‘his own.’ Nevertheless, there was a 
rationale for allowing such rights. A founder had a natural reason to know and care 
about the charity’s operations. Also, permitting him to sue would not expose the charity 
to vexatious litigation from indifferent members of the public.”).  
 84.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f. (1959) (“Where property is 
given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by the terms of the gift to devote the 
property to a particular one of its purposes, it is under a duty, enforceable at the suit of 
the Attorney General, to devote the property to that purpose.”); But see L.B. Research 
and Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710 (2005), where court deemed 
plaintiff donor was entitled to standing as a responsible individual with a legitimate 
interest in the charitable trust.  
 85.  Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1143; See, e.g., Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. 
of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996 (1997). 
 86.  Rachel M. Williams, Note, Transitioning from UMIFA to UPMIFA: How the 
Promulgation of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act Will 
Affect Donor-Initiated Lawsuits Brought Against Colleges and Universities, 37 J.C. & 
U.L. 201, 205 (2010) [hereinafter Williams].  
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Douglas M. Salaway, UMIFA and a Model For Endowment Investing, 22 J.C. 
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inconsistencies, much of the pertinent case law was reduced 
to “a series of seemingly disjointed cases that made it difficult 
for governing boards and their attorneys to predict judicial 
judgment.”89 
On the plaintiff donor’s end, the odds of choosing a 
winning offensive strategy to enforce the terms of his or her 
gift were equally dubious, and the problem was compounded 
by the fact that “donors did not have, and still do not have, 
standing to sue a charity for non-compliance with donor-
imposed restrictions.”90  Despite the slim chance that a court 
would hear the merits of their claims, many donors turned to 
the courts for remedy, only to have their claims dismissed for 
lack of standing.91  And still, in the limited number of 
instances where a donor was able to get a foot in the door and 
voice his or her grievances, it was the court’s tendency to 
extend protection to the defendant institution.92 
To encourage uniformity and consistency in the 
governance of donative funds, forty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia, have adopted statutes based upon 
regulations created and endorsed by the Uniform Law 
Commission.93  The Uniform Management of Institutional 
Funds Act (“UMIFA”), which was the first uniform law 
constructed to guide the investment and management of 
charitable gifts, was drafted in 1972.94  UMIFA was 
 
& U.L. 1045, 1064 (1996) [hereinafter Salaway]. 
 89.  Id. at 1065.  
 90.  Williams, supra note 86, at 207; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. 
f, (1959) (“Where property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by the 
terms of the gift to devote the property to a particular one of its purposes, it is under a 
duty, enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to devote the property to that 
purpose.”). 
 91.  Id. at 228 (“The most highly litigated issue seems to be whether there is donor 
standing to bring a lawsuit to object to the use of funds or enforce a restriction.”).  
 92.  See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Quincy, 258 N.E.2d 745, 753 (Mass. 1970) 
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk court refused to enforce a donor’s 
gift restrictions despite the fact that the donor expressly intended for those provisions 
to be mandatory); See also Wilbur v. Univ. of Vt., 270 A.2d 889 (Vt. 1970) (Supreme 
Court of Vermont held that a university’s violation of the terms of a gift agreement 
“[did] not entitle the settlor or his successor to enforce” the restrictions outlined in the 
instrument).  
 93.  UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org (last visited Oct. 11, 
2011) (The Uniform Law Commission “provides states with non-partisan, well-
conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas 
of the law.”). 
 94.  UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on 
Unif. State Laws 1972). 
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revolutionary in that it established, for the first time, 
“uniform and fundamental rules for the investment of funds 
held by charitable institutions and the expenditure of funds 
donated as ‘endowments’ to those institutions.”95 
The Uniform Law Commission drafted UMIFA to 
ameliorate conflicts and strike a balance of interests between 
plaintiff donors and defendant institutions regarding donative 
intent and gift restrictions 96  To accommodate charitable 
institutions bestowed with gifts bearing impracticable 
provisions, UMIFA permitted the release of donor-imposed 
restrictions in certain circumstances.97  Conversely, to 
safeguard donor intent, particular regulations imposed by 
UMIFA could be limited or even annulled by a written 
agreement between the parties.98  In general, the overarching 
aim of the Uniform Law Commission in drafting UMIFA was 
to ensure that “funds held by charitable institutions [were] 
managed and used prudently and according to the donor’s 
intentions without deterring the operation of the charity or 
unduly restricting its ability to respond to changes in the 
world.”99 
In 2006, the Uniform Law Commission gave UMIFA a 
facelift, revamping and updating the laws governing the 
management and investment of institutional funds by 
promulgating the Uniform Prudent Management of 
Institutional Funds Act (“UPMIFA”).100  While UPMIFA’s 
primary objective is not unlike that of UMIFA’s, the new Act 
“modernized” its predecessor in several respects.101  Notably, 
the 2006 revision sought to liberalize the conditions under 
which donor-imposed restrictions can be modified by a 
 
 95.  Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION, 
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Prudent%20Management%20of%20Inst
itutional%20Funds%20Act (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). 
 96.  Williams, supra note 86, at 208.  
 97.  UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 7 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs 
on Unif. State Laws 1972). 
 98.  See, e.g., UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §§ 3, 4, 5 (Nat’l 
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 1972); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF 
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §§ 3(a), 3(e), 4(a), 4(b) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. 
State Laws 2006); UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 1 cmt. (Nat’l 
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 1972) (The UMIFA considered any writing 
that “establishes the terms of the gift” to be an authoritative “gift instrument.”) 
 99.  Williams, supra note 86, at 208.  
 100.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348, cmt. f, (1959). 
 101.  Williams, supra note 86, at 208.  
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charitable institution.102  Under the original provisions of 
UMIFA, an institution was unable to rely upon the courts for 
legal modification or release of donor-imposed restrictions.103  
While a restriction can be modified or released by merely 
obtaining written consent from the donor, in practice, 
“obtaining donor consent can be impossible, at worst, or 
extremely burdensome, at least.”104  To rectify this matter, the 
Uniform Law Commission chose to supplement UPMIFA’s 
provisions with the trust doctrines of cy pres and equitable 
deviation.105  The incorporation of these doctrines was 
intended not only to broaden the scope of judicial remedy 
available to institutions paralyzed by donor-imposed gift 
restrictions, but also to foster “an approach that favors 
modification over release to protect donor intent.”106 
Yet despite the Uniform Laws’ mutual missions to 
mitigate conflicts between donors and institutions, in the 
years since its original enactment and its 2006 revitalization, 
donors have rarely relied upon UMIFA or UPMIFA in 
bringing lawsuits against colleges and universities.  Rather, 
donors who actually see their claims survive to trial have 
reverted to more traditional principles of contract law, trust 
law, or corporate law to back the substance of their suits.107  
The use of these legal doctrines “precludes the use of UMIFA’s 
principles of interpretation in any way because contract, 
trust, or corporate law will be applied in a manner 
 
 102.  Id. at 209. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 214.  
 105.  UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(c) (Nat’l Conference 
of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2006); JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS, 701 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2007) (1998) (Using cy pres, a 
court is able to modify, in some way, a donor’s instruction on the use or purpose of a 
gift.  However, any modifications sought by an institution as to the purpose of a donor’s 
gift must be consistent with the donor’s intent as articulated in the gift instrument.  A 
court’s decision to apply the doctrine of cy pres in trust law is dependent upon the 
charitable institution’s ability to demonstrate: (1) that the gift was given “to a 
charitable organization for a charitable purpose”; (2) that it is “impossible, impractical 
or illegal to carry out the donor’s stated charitable purpose”; and (3) “that the donor had 
general charitable intent.”); Williams, supra note 85, at 217 (“Equitable deviation 
applies under virtually the same circumstances as cy pres, except that it applies not to 
the purpose of a fund but to the means used to carry out that purpose.”).  
 106.  Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform 
Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1328 (2007).  
 107.  Id.  
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corresponding to the parties’ characterization of the case.”108  
In the vast majority of cases, however, donors are unable to 
advance the ball far enough to even utilize an offensive 
strategy.  Lack of standing is an aggrieved donor’s most 
formidable opponent, and as a result, the substantive issues 
underlying a donor’s claim for enforcement of the terms of a 
gift are rarely adjudicated.  In order for the merits of donor-
initiated lawsuits to be heard and remedied, donors first must 
find a way to clear the hurdle of standing.  As demonstrated 
by the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s decision in Carl J. 
Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, however, 
the Uniform Laws are of little utility. 
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reaffirmed the 
preeminence of the common law standard when it held that 
the Carl J. Herzog Foundation lacked standing to enforce the 
terms of its $250,000 gift to the University of Bridgeport.109  
For some time prior to the cause of action, the Carl J. Herzog 
Foundation (herein “Foundation”) gave money to Bridgeport 
University (herein “University”) to provide need-based merit 
scholarships to disadvantaged students demonstrating an 
interest in the medical field.110  On August 12, 1986, the 
Foundation wrote a letter to the University agreeing to 
participate in a “matching grant program” that essentially 
extended their previously established donor-donee 
relationship.111  In the letter, the Foundation expressly 
outlined its intent that the funds go to “disadvantaged 
students for medical related education on a continuing 
basis.”112  Several weeks later, on September 9, 1986, the 
Foundation received an acceptance letter from the University 
in which it agreed to a $250,000 grant match arrangement.113 
Over a period of two years, both parties fulfilled their 
respective obligations.114  The University raised the agreed-
upon sum of $250,000, and the Foundation matched it, paying 
$144,000 in June 1987 and $106,000 approximately one year 
later.115  In accordance with the Foundation’s wishes, the 
 
 108.  Id. at 229.  
 109.  Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996 (1997). 
 110.  Id. at 996.  
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 996. 
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grant money was used to provide scholarships to students 
enrolled in the University’s nursing program.116  In June 
1991, however, the University closed its nursing school.117  
The Foundation filed suit against the University requesting a 
“temporary and permanent injunction [and] ordering the 
defendant ‘to segregate from its general funds matching 
grants totaling $250,000.’”118  The Foundation also demanded 
an accounting for the fund and insisted that it be 
reestablished in conformance with the purposes expressed in 
the original gift instrument.119  The complaint further 
asserted that if the University could not satisfy the terms of 
the original agreement, the funds were to be redirected to the 
Bridgeport Area Foundation.120 
Herzog Foundation presents one of the rare examples 
where a plaintiff donor attempted to premise both the 
substance of its claim as well as its entitlement to standing on 
a state’s adoption of UMIFA.121  In its complaint, the 
Foundation articulated its belief that the institutional funds 
had been intermixed with University’s general funds, and 
that the money was not being used in accordance with the 
terms of the gift instrument.122  Following the trial court’s 
initial dismissal of the Foundation’s suit for lack of standing 
and the appellate court’s subsequent reversal, the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut decided to hear the case.123  The question 
before the court was whether the state legislature, by 
adopting UMIFA, intended to arm charitable donors with 
standing to enforce the terms of a completed gift when the gift 
instrument in question “contained no express reservation of 
control over the disposition of the gift.”124 
Reiterating the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and citing 
case law from an array of jurisdictions, the court reaffirmed 
the common law principle that unless a donor expressly 
 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Id. (citing the statement of facts presented by the lower court in Carl J. Herzog 
Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1380 (1996), rev’d, 699 
A.2d 995 (1997)). 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 996. (In this specific case, the Connecticut Uniform 
Management of Institutional Funds Act, or “CUMIFA”).  
 122.  Id. at 996.  
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 997.  
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retained a right of control expressed as a restricted gift, the 
state attorney general was vested with the exclusive 
authority to bring an action to remedy the mishandling of a 
trust.125  The court concluded that the Connecticut legislature 
did not intend for the Uniform Act to supplant the common 
law.126  Specifically, the court cited a comment authored by 
UMIFA’s drafters, which stated: “The donor has no right to 
enforce the restriction, no interest in the fund and no power to 
change the [] beneficiary of the fund. He may only acquiesce 
in a lessening of a restriction already in effect.”127  As such, 
the Foundation was denied standing.128 
Although donors sought to find relief in UMIFA and 
UPMIFA, the uniform laws have been of little utility to 
aggrieved donors seeking to direct and control the use of a 
completed, unrestricted gift.  A plaintiff donor lacks standing 
at common law to enforce the terms of a completed gift unless 
he expressly reserves the right to do so in the gift instrument 
negotiated with the donee institution.  Thus, to avoid conflicts 
regarding the terms of a gift agreement, it is imperative that 
before completing a donation, the terms and expectations of 
the gift are discussed and settled by the parties.  If an 
institution or organization willingly accepts a restricted gift, 
however, they become legally obligated to enforce and abide 
by the terms of that gift.129 
III: VENTURE PHILANTHROPY, SPECIAL INTERESTS AND A 
BREAKTHROUGH FOR DONOR STANDING 
Despite the growing trend towards gift control and 
oversight, the law remains partial to unconditional, no-
 
 125.  Id. at 998.  
 126.  Id. at 999-1000.  
 127.  Herzog Found., 699 A.2d at 1001. 
 128.  Id. at 1002. 
 129.  Regardless of the amount, some restricted gifts are simply too cumbersome for 
institutions to accept. In 1907, Swarthmore College received coal lands and mineral 
rights worth an estimated $1-$3 million from wealthy Quaker Anna T. Jeanes. At the 
time, Swarthmore’s entire endowment was only worth $1 million. Ms. Jeanes 
conditioned her gift, however, stating in her will that Swarthmore would only receive 
the land if the college permanently “discontinue[d] and abandon[ed] all participation in 
intercollegiate athletics, sports and games.” Unwilling to sacrifice its athletic programs, 
Swarthmore refused the gift. See Will Treece, The Football Controversy Through the 
Ages, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE DAILY GAZETTE (Oct. 7, 2009), 
http://daily.swarthmore.edu/2009/10/07/athletics/. 
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strings-attached philanthropy.130  This intersection – where a 
donor’s desire for control meets the law’s preference for 
unrestricted giving – has spawned numerous legal battles.  In 
spite of the law’s persistent efforts to foster the notion of 
unrestricted philanthropic giving and stifle the growing 
interest in gift control and oversight, donors and charitable 
foundations began seeking alternatives to conventional 
giving. “Venture philanthropy” is a term used to describe 
private donors’ and foundations’ inclination in recent years to 
adopt strategies and methods employed in the for-profit 
world.131  Instead of relinquishing control upon the completion 
of a charitable gift, a venture philanthropist’s contribution to 
a non-profit organization may be premised on specific terms 
and conditions agreed upon by the parties.132  Often, the donor 
retains the ability to provide business advice to the 
organization or serve in a managerial capacity.133 
In 1971, decades before the term “venture philanthropist” 
was coined, Brink Smithers made a $10 million gift to 
Roosevelt Hospital134 (“the Hospital”) in New York City for the 
establishment of an alcohol rehabilitation center.135  Per his 
zealous advocacy of new treatment mechanisms and his 
generous monetary gift, Mr. Smithers “affected a revolution in 
the treatment of alcoholism and brought about the 
professionalization of the field.”136  In his initial letter of 
intent to the Hospital, Mr. Smithers reserved significant 
responsibilities for himself as a donor, such as requiring that 
specific “project plans and staff appointments have his 
approval.”137  It was Smithers’ fervent intent to maintain an 
active role in the program.  Interestingly, despite Mr. 
Smithers’ wealth of personal experience as a lifelong alcoholic, 
he lacked any professional qualifications in the medical 
field.138  The Hospital nevertheless accepted the gift with its 
 
 130.  Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of 
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2439 (2005). 
 131.  Rothschild, supra note 19, at 110. 
 132.  Id. at 110-11. 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Roosevelt Hospital later merged with St. Luke’s to become “Roosevelt/St. 
Luke’s Hospital.”  
 135.  Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 426. Mr. Smithers was not only a pioneer as a 
venture philanthropist, but also in his conviction that alcoholism was a disease.  
 136.  Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1096.  
 137.  Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 427. 
 138.  Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1096.  
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terms, and Smithers’ vision culminated in the founding of the 
Smithers Alcoholism Treatment and Training Center 
(“Smithers Center”) in New York City.139 
In response to adverse economic conditions, including 
Medicaid budget cuts, the Hospital began to consider making 
changes to its alcohol rehabilitation program.140  Specifically, 
it contemplated the sale of an Upper East Side in-patient 
facility.141  Mr. Smithers, maintaining an active role in the 
management of the program, vigilantly opposed the sale of 
the Upper Eastside house and contested that it was “integral 
to the program under the terms of his gift.”142  Despite the 
escalating tension between Smithers and the Hospital 
regarding the gift’s donative intent, the house was not sold 
during Smithers’ lifetime.143  After Smithers’ death in 1995, 
however, the Hospital moved forward with its plan, and Mrs. 
Smithers, administratrix of her late husband’s estate, sought 
the help of the attorney general to prevent the sale.144  
Dissatisfied with the attorney general’s handling of the 
matter, Mrs. Smithers pursued judicial remedy in 2001.145 
The Smithers decision constitutes a turning point in donor-
initiated litigation because, for the first time, the traditional 
obstacles to donor standing were circumvented.  Although the 
New York Court of Appeals acknowledged the state attorney 
general’s role in the enforcement of charitable gifts, it 
nevertheless chose to raise, sua sponte, whether the attorney 
general’s delegated right was exclusive.146  The court 
determined that the plaintiff administratrix, Mrs. Smithers, 
had standing consistent with that of the attorney general to 
pursue her gift enforcement claim against the defendant 
hospital.147 
In its analysis, the court looked to Associated Alumni of 
General Theological Seminary v. General Theological 
Seminary, a decision rendered by the New York Appellate 
Division and later affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals 
 
 139.  Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 427.  
 140.  Goodwin, supra note 69, at1097.  
 141.  Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 428-29. 
 142.  Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1097.  
 143.  Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 428-29. 
 144.  Id. at 430-32. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 431-32. 
 147.  Id.  
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in 1900.148  In that case, various alumni of General 
Theological Seminary had given funds to the institution for 
the purpose of endowing a professorship.149  In the gift 
instrument, the alumni attached certain conditions to the 
endowment, specifically reserving a right of nomination in the 
event that the chair became vacant.150  When conflict arose 
between the alumni association and the institution regarding 
those conditions, the alumni filed suit against the 
Seminary.151  The lower court held that, due to the plaintiff’s 
retention of the right of nomination, it was entitled to 
standing as a donor.152  After allowing the alumni association 
standing, the court was able to address the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim and determined that the Seminary had 
indeed violated the provisions of the gift agreement.153 
Although the New York Court of Appeals upheld arguably 
the most important aspect of the lower court’s ruling in 
Associated Alumni regarding a donor’s right to standing, it 
altered the remedy, ordering specific performance from the 
defendant institution rather than monetary refund.154  The 
New York Court of Appeals reasoned that in order for a gift to 
be refunded to a donor, a right of reversion must be an 
express provision in the gift instrument.155  Because such a 
condition was not included in the alumni association’s deed of 
gift, merely returning the money to the donor was an 
improper remedy, as doing so would virtually dissolve the 
trust.156  Due to its reservation of nomination, however, the 
court held that the alumni association had sufficient standing 
to maintain its action for the gift’s enforcement.157 
In rendering the Smithers decision, the court reasoned 
that, although Mr. Smithers had not retained a reversion, he 
nevertheless “retained a supervisory role with respect to [his] 
gift and indeed had served in this supervisory role,” not 
 
 148.  Id. at 432. 
 149.  Assoc. Alumni of the Gen. Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal 
Church in the United States of Am. v. Gen. Theological Seminary of the Protestant 
Episcopal Church in the United States, 163 N.Y. 417, 420 (1900).  
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id.  
 152.  Id. at 422.  
 153.  Id. at 421-22. 
 154.  Id. at 422.  
 155.  Assoc. Alumni, 163 N.Y. at 421-22.  
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. at 422.  
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dissimilar from the right of nomination reserved by the 
donors in Associated Alumni.158  The court articulated that 
Smithers’ retention of an oversight role was therefore enough 
to arm his estate with standing to enforce the terms of his 
gift.159  Furthermore, the court justified Mrs. Smithers’ right 
to standing by distinguishing her from other disinterested 
plaintiffs the common law standard intended to shun.160  
Unlike those plaintiffs who may bring “vexatious litigation” 
against a charity despite having no tangible stake in the 
outcome, the court noted that Mrs. Smithers had served a 
critical function in monitoring the Hospital’s compliance with 
the terms of the gift.161  Additionally, the court observed that 
Mrs. Smithers had demonstrated far greater interest and 
diligence in the matter of preserving her late husband’s 
mission than did the attorney general.162 
CONCLUSION 
Relying upon the logic of Smithers, major donors in college 
sports inarguably demonstrate special interest and dedication 
to the success and prosperity of their chosen institution.  
Furthermore, certain donors and boosters indeed have the 
qualifications and experience to make educated, rational, 
informed decisions regarding the direction of an athletic 
program.  Robert Burton, for example, played football both 
collegiately and professionally, and may have been justified in 
stating that “[he is] fully qualified to assess coaches and their 
ability to match up with [UConn’s] needs.”163  Advocating 
venture philanthropy in the realm of collegiate athletics 
would theoretically allow these interested parties – armed 
with a vision for a program’s success – to permissively buy 
access, influence, and power through monetary contributions. 
Irrefutably, Burton’s contribution to UConn Football 
enhanced the program.  The new facility became a 
 
 158.  Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1155. 
 159.  Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 434. 
 160.  See id. at 435 (asserting that “Mrs. Smithers herself. . .ha[d] her own special, 
personal interest in the enforcement of the Gift restrictions imposed by her husband, as 
[was] manifest from her own fundraising work on behalf of the Smithers Center and the 
fact that the gala that she organized and that the Hospital ultimately cancelled was to 
be in her honor as well as her husband’s.”). 
 161.  See Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1155. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Burton letter, supra note 1.  
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cornerstone of the program, and was a catalyst for its rise to 
prominence.  Hiring an adept, qualified coach is equally vital 
to shaping a successful program. Yet there remains a palpable 
discrepancy between the two – while we encourage and 
commend major donors for the facilities they construct and 
the equipment they provide, there is something unsavory 
about allowing a major donor to explicitly “buy” influence over 
coaching decisions at the collegiate level.164  Put differently, if 
the NCAA is indeed attempting to preserve the integrity and 
amateurism of college athletics, then there may be something 
inherently wrong with fostering a model of venture 
philanthropy and allowing boosters to reserve supervisory 
and nomination rights in college athletics. 
On the other hand, the watchful eye of the NCAA may 
serve as a sufficient restriction allowing venture philanthropy 
to improve intercollegiate competition, athletic facilities, and 
coaching staffs during an economic downturn when 
institutions need it most. The cost of staying competitive in 
Division I athletics continues to rise each year.  Given the 
instability of our nation’s current economic climate, colleges 
and universities will be forced to solicit contributions from 
donors in order to sustain their athletic programs and 
maintain a presence in the Division I arms race.  As research 
on donor motivation demonstrates, there is indeed a growing 
market for major donors seeking access and influence in 
college sports.  If philanthropy’s trend towards control 
continues, it is plausible that institutions may be inclined to 
accept restricted gifts from major donors seeking to be 
consulted in athletic department decisions. 
Conceptually, collegiate donors like Robert Burton are not 
all that different from Brink Smithers.  Each had a special 
interest in their respective institutions’ goal, and had a vision 
for how to best attain that goal.  The only difference between 
these men is that Brink Smithers expressly retained the right 
to oversee his dollars at work.  Unfortunately for disgruntled 
donors like Burton, however, this is the only difference that 
legally matters.  Until colleges and universities become more 
 
 164.  Burton never expressly stated in his letter that he believed his monetary 
contributions to UConn would allow him to select the next football coach. His 
complaints related in large part to the lack of stewardship shown by UConn. Though 
most institutions recognize the importance and value of nurturing and cultivating 
relationships with their major donors, the fiduciary duty and stewardship owed to a 
donor upon the completion of an unrestricted gift is premised entirely on good faith.  
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willing to accept restricted gifts from donors seeking influence 
and oversight, athletic departments and administrative 
boards retain the right to leave their donors – even multi-
million dollar donors like Robert Burton – out in the cold 
when it comes to decision-making. 
 
